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JUDICIAL TAKINGS: MUSINGS ON STOP THE BEACH 
James E. Krier* 
 Judicial takings weren’t much talked about until a few years ago, when the 
Stop the Beach case made them suddenly salient.1  The case arose from a Florida 
statute, enacted in 1961, that authorizes public restoration of eroded beaches by 
adding sand to widen them seaward.  Under the statute, the state has title to any 
new dry land resulting from restored beaches, meaning that waterfront owners 
whose land had previously extended to the mean high-tide line end up with public 
beaches between their land and the water.  This, the owners claimed, resulted in a 
taking of their property, more particularly their rights under Florida common law 
to receive accretions to their frontage on the water, and to have their property 
remain in contact with the water.  The state supreme court disagreed, concluding 
that the owners never had the rights they claimed.  The owners then sought (and 
were granted) review by the Supreme Court, the question now being whether the 
state supreme court’s decision worked a judicial taking because it was contrary to 
Florida common law.  They lost, all of the participating justices concurring in the 
view that the Florida court’s decision did not contravene any established property 
rights.   
 So there was no judgment of a judicial taking in Stop the Beach, nor, 
indeed, any judgment that “there is such a thing as a judicial taking,” because only 
                                                            
* Earl Warren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan Law School.    
 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Tenth Annual Brigham-
Kanner Property Rights Conference, William & Mary Law School, October 17-18, 2013.  
I thank John Echeverria for his comments and suggestions, and Tom Merrill for lending 
me some of his thoughts on judicial takings. 
1 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Stop the Beach), 560 
U.S. 702 (2010). 
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four members of the Court think that.2  The plurality opinion, written by Justice 
Scalia as a part of his opinion for the Court, concludes that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause plainly applies to all the branches of government, 
not just the executive and legislative.  “If a legislature or a court declares that 
what was once a private right of ownership no longer exists, it has taken that 
property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its 
value by regulation.”3  
 These views have already provoked a fairly considerable literature.  I 
don’t claim to have read all the articles, but I have sampled many and learned a 
lot.  The literature about Stop the Beach is way more illuminating than the 
opinions in the case itself, the plurality opinion especially, but like the plurality 
opinion the literature is provocative.  And just as Stop the Beach has moved 
scholars to muse, so their musing has led me to do the same.  What follows are 
some riffs on the case and the scholarship alike, part primer and part critique.   
I 
 The law of takings distinguishes between (1) explicit takings of private 
property under the government’s inherent power of eminent domain, and (2) 
implicit takings of private property caused by legislation, administrative 
regulation, or other governmental actions.  In type 1 cases, the government sues in 
a condemnation action; in type 2 cases, the property owner sues in an inverse 
                                                            
2 Id. at 718.  Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court, in which all of the justices 
concurred, and the plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas 
and Alito.  There were two separate opinions concurring in the judgment but not in the 
plurality’s views on judicial takings – one by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice 
Sotomayor, the other by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg.  Justice Stevens did 
not participate in the case. 
3 Id. at 715. 
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condemnation action.  There is no issue about a taking in type 1 cases, the very 
point of the lawsuit being to force the sale of the property in question (which the 
government may do, provided the transfer is for a public use and that just 
compensation is paid).  There is always an issue about a taking in type 2 cases, 
where the property owner claims that the government’s actions amount to a 
taking, even though the government insists otherwise. 
 Judicial takings, if there ever is such a thing, would be takings of type 2, 
governed by a cluster of Supreme Court rules conventionally referred to as the 
law of “regulatory takings.” The label is inaccurate, because type 2 cases 
commonly arise in instances where the consequences of the governmental action 
in question have no relation whatsoever to any proximate regulatory provision, 
whether legislative or administrative.  It is better to think in terms of explicit and 
implicit takings, and I take the license to do so at times in the discussion that 
follows.   
II 
A 
 As mentioned above, only a plurality of the Court believes that there can 
even be such a thing as a judicial taking.  Skeptics suggest that logically judicial 
takings can’t really exist.  A common version of the argument based on logic runs 
as simply as this:  Courts lack the power of eminent domain.  Since they are thus 
incapable of explicitly taking property, they are also incapable of implicitly taking 
property. 
3
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 I find this line of argument unpersuasive.  Eminent domain is an inherent 
power of government.  Nothing in the Constitution confers it; the Takings Clause 
operates to limit it.  The clause’s constraints apply to the government generally.  
No language indicates or even suggests that courts are excluded from the 
generalization. Professor Thompson, after reviewing historical materials 
regarding the drafting of the Takings Clause, concludes that it occurred to no one 
to consider its applicability to the judiciary. “The original understanding of a 
taking,” he says, “was simply too narrow to raise the issue: the fifth amendment’s 
takings provision was addressed not to the type of indirect, regulatory taking that 
most judicial property changes resemble, but to traditional exercises of eminent 
domain.”4   
 Such a history hardly puts judicial takings logically out of constitutional 
bounds.  It tells us nothing about what the original understanding might have been 
had judicial takings been on the table.  But they weren’t; the focus was on explicit 
exercises of the eminent domain power (the idea, and thus the law, of implicit 
takings developed many years later).  And I suppose no court had ever entertained 
the notion that it could explicitly condemn property, or that it should.  That would 
have been an audacious challenge to convention shaped by “traditional exercises 
of eminent domain,” as Thompson puts it. So we can say for sure that there was 
and is no practice of explicit condemnation by courts, but that hardly denies the 
power of courts to do what traditional practice has left to the other branches. 
 
                                                            
4 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1458 (1990).  
Thompson’s article, though published two decades before the opinions in Stop the Beach, 
is as valuable now as it was before.   
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B 
 But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that there clearly is no power 
in the courts to engage in explicit condemnation.  It would be an obvious non-
sequitur to conclude from this that judicial decisions cannot work implicit takings. 
The logical fault is illustrated by Professors Dana and Merrill in their 
indispensable text on the law of takings.5 They observe, correctly, that 
condemnation and regulation are substitute means by which governments can 
control the use and ownership of property. If condemnation is used, the 
government has to pay; if regulation is used, it does not, unless some body of law 
says otherwise. The Court’s law of implicit takings says otherwise, for the 
obvious reason: If government could choose freely between condemnation and 
regulation, it would be inclined to favor regulation in order to evade the obligation 
to pay compensation.6 To control against undesirable substitution effects, the 
Court’s rules of decision aim to force compensation when regulation “has an 
impact [on property rights] functionally equivalent to an exercise of eminent 
domain.”7  But “courts, unlike legislatures and many executive agencies, do not 
have the power to take property by eminent domain.  Consequently, the basic 
logic for the [implicit] takings doctrine . . . does not apply to courts:  It is difficult 
to say that a court, by changing the law, is seeking to evade any obligation that it 
has . . . .”8   
                                                            
5 DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS (2002). 
6 Id. at 4-5.  We can draw an analogy to federal estate and gift taxes.  An estate tax must 
sensibly be accompanied by a gift tax in order to prevent estate tax avoidance by making 
inter vivos gifts. 
7 Id. at 4. 
8 Id. at 229-30. 
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 The fault in the argument is apparent.  Dana and Merrill simply assume 
that the power of eminent domain necessarily entails the power to take by explicit 
condemnation, which I have suggested is a contestable proposition.  Yet, in my 
view, it doesn’t matter.  Whether or not courts have the power of eminent domain, 
governments surely do, and courts, as the plurality in South Beach correctly 
observes, are indisputably a branch of the government.  Governments also have 
the purse power, and thus the means, unavailable to the judicial branch, to pay 
compensation for judicial takings.9  And just as governments should not be able to  
evade the obligations of the Takings Clause by substituting regulatory activity for 
explicit condemnation, they should not be able to evade the obligations by 
substituting judicial activity for regulatory activity. 
III 
 Even if there are no logical reasons to fuss about judicial takings, there are 
prudential ones.  Before we get into these, it is important to have in mind what 
judicial takings are about – better, what they would probably be about should the 
South Beach plurality someday win another vote.   
 Judicial takings are solely concerned with court decisions that re-allocate 
existing property rights by changing established property doctrine.10  Note two 
points: While statutes and administrative regulations can change doctrine too, thus 
triggering the Takings Clause, legislative and executive actions can also work 
takings in ways that judicial actions cannot.11  Relatedly, statutes and regulations 
                                                            
9 Actually, courts may have the means to pay, in a way.  See infra note 38. 
10 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 1450; DANA & MERRILL, supra note 5, at 228-29. 
11 The obvious example is explicit condemnation.  Another is government enterprises that 
interfere with private property (as when a public sewer system causes flooding). 
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might change doctrine and reallocate rights, yet still not amount to takings under 
the Supreme Court’s rules.  Whether this is true of judicial decisions as well is a 
nice question, as we shall see.  
 At least from the standpoint of the Takings Clause, courts and the other 
governmental branches are free to change established property rules so long as 
there is no alteration in existing property rights. The Court made this plain long 
ago:  “A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common 
law.”12  An illustration: Four states (Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode 
Island) still recognize the common law fee tail.  They could abolish it, but only as 
to fees tail created after the date of the abolition.  Retroactive abolition would 
probably be a taking, because it would wipe out property rights already created, 
namely any vested remainders and reversions.13  Never mind that those rights are 
worthless or nearly so, because in fact, though not in law, they are contingent to a 
fault, little more than expectancies. 
 Retroactive abolition of the fee tail might be accomplished by legislation 
or by independent judicial decision, but there could be a judicial taking in either 
case, as Stop the Beach makes clear.  The point is obvious in the case of judicial 
abolition. As to legislative abolition, a judicial taking looms if a party sues in state 
court claiming that the abolition works a taking, and the court upholds the 
                                                            
12 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877). 
13 See, e.g., Green v. Edwards, 77 A. 188 (R.I. 1877) (holding that retroactive abolition of 
the fee tail is an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law).  So 
the Court in Munn observed:  “Rights of property which have been created by the 
common law cannot be taken away without due process.”  94 U.S. at 134.  Today, I 
presume, these decisions would talk about takings rather than due process.  On judicial 
takings versus due process, see Eduardo M. Peñalalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Judicial Takings or Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305 (2012).   
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legislation in light of state common law.  The party could then seek review in the 
Supreme Court or sue in federal district court, claiming a judicial taking in that 
the state court changed the state’s established property law doctrine.  The federal 
court would have to determine whether the state common law really is what the 
state court said it was. Federal oversight could also result from claims filed by 
property owners who were not parties to the initial litigation that led to judicial 
takings challenges, but sue independently, asserting in federal court that the 
judicial decision upholding the retroactive abolition of the fee tail takes their 
property rights. 
IV 
 The path to federal oversight of alleged state takings is complicated by 
various procedural rules developed by the Court.  The details of this part of the 
story are well treated elsewhere, so I leave them aside.14  Whatever the path, the 
end point finds one federal court or another involved in the interpretation of state 
property law.  So, critics argue, even if judicial takings are not logically out of 
bounds, they are objectionable for prudential reasons: Judicial takings would 
flood the federal courts with litigation involving issues beyond their immediate 
expertise, intrude unduly on the state’s acknowledged authority to define property 
rights, and impose financial obligations that compromise the prerogative of the 
states’ political branches (the judiciary is not such a branch) to manage the 
expenditure of public funds.    
                                                            
14 See D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 
903 (2011).  
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 The weightiness of these concerns is a function of, among other things, the 
frequency with which judicial takings would be found to have occurred, but I 
don’t see how anyone can provide even a rough estimate of that.  One would need 
to know, first of all, how often property owners find occasion to assert in law suits 
that judicial decisions “declare that what was once an established right of property 
no longer exists”15 – more to the point, how often property owners would find 
occasion to make such an assertion were a doctrine of judicial takings to become 
the law of the land.  After all, the doctrine might constrain courts from declaring 
what they otherwise would have declared.  If the universe of relevant instances is 
or would be tiny, then so too the consequences of the doctrine, at least insofar as 
the obligation to pay compensation is concerned.  
 Second, whatever the size of the universe, the number of instances in 
which judicial takings would actually be found is sure to be smaller, and maybe 
substantially so, or even overwhelmingly so.  But to make a rough guess about 
this we need to know exactly what the plurality opinion means in saying that 
judicial takings would arise whenever courts declare that established property 
rights no longer exist.  The statement might seem clear, but it isn’t, as evidenced 
by the divergent interpretations of it found in the literature.  Below I consider 
some ambiguities and what various commentators make of them. 
A 
 We might suppose that since the courts are just another branch of 
government, they should be treated just like the other branches when it comes to 
takings.  The plurality opinion in South Beach can be read to stand for this 
                                                            
15 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 715. 
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proposition.  In its little exegesis on “some general principles of our takings 
jurisprudence,” the plurality notes that “our doctrine of regulatory takings ‘aims to 
identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking 
[by condemnation under the power of eminent domain].’”16   For examples, the 
plurality cites several of the Court’s rules: when government action works a 
permanent physical occupation of private land, there is a taking; when 
government action wipes out all economically beneficial use of private property, 
there is a taking; when government action re-characterizes as public property 
what before was private property, there is a taking. 
 Anyone familiar with takings law knows there is more to it than this.  The 
plurality’s examples refer to several of the Court’s per se or categorical takings 
rules – rules of the form “if X happens, that is always a taking.”   The rules are 
not quite so hard-edged as the plurality opinion suggests. It notes that temporary 
physical occupations are not takings per se, but leaves unmentioned that this is 
also true of  wipeouts of value (the latter of which, moreover, are never takings if 
they are the consequence of controlling common law nuisances, and not per se 
takings if they wipeout the value of only part of a parcel).17  Putting the common 
law nuisance exception aside, all of the instances above – and many others 
involving government actions that impact the value or use of private property – 
might still work takings under the multi-factor, ad hoc test laid out in the Penn 
                                                            
16 Id. at 713, quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
17 For most purposes, the Court considers takings challenges by looking at the impact of a 
government action on the whole piece of property involved, as opposed to just a part of it.  
This is to say that the Court rejects a practice of “conceptual severance.”   
10
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Central case.18   The probability of a property owner winning a takings claim 
under that test, however, is very low.  So is the probability of a property owner 
being able to rely on any of the per se rules, because government agents have 
learned to abstain from activities that cause permanent physical occupations and 
permanent wipeouts of entire parcels.   
B 
 It seems to follow from the foregoing that if (1) courts are subject to the 
same constraints as the other branches, then (2) successful judicial takings 
challenges would be rather few and far between.  But point (2) follows only if 
point (1) holds, and on this the plurality is unclear and the commentators divided.  
Professor Somin, for example, agrees with point (2) because he reads the plurality 
opinion to say that point (1) does hold.  His interpretation relies on Justice 
Scalia’s statement that condemnation by eminent domain “is always a taking, 
while a legislative, executive, or judicial restriction of property use may or may 
not be, depending on its nature and extent.”19  The emphasis in that statement is 
Somin’s.  He could as well have emphasized the last words of the statement – 
                                                            
18 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U. S. 104, 124-25.  Most 
simply stated, the multi-factor test considers the diminution in value of property caused 
by the government action, the extent to which the action interferes with the owner’s 
distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.  For 
a fuller statement and examination of the factors, see DANA & MERRILL, supra note 5, at 
131-64. 
19 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 715; Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the 
Problem of Judicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 105 (2011). There 
are other statements in the plurality opinion that support Somin’s interpretation.  See Stop 
the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (Takings Clause “is concerned simply with the act, and not 
with the governmental actor”); (“There is no textual justification for saying that [the 
existence or scope of government power to take property without just compensation] 
varies according to the branch of government”); (“Our precedents provide no support for 
the proposition that takings effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special 
treatment”). 
11
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“depending on its nature and extent” – because those words also suggest that the 
plurality would apply to the judicial branch the rather forgiving body of rules that 
the Court applies to the legislative and executive, lock, stock, and barrel.  This 
includes, Somin infers, the multi-factor test of Penn Central, which “[c]ourts 
generally apply . . . in ways that favor the government.”20    
 Contrast the view of Professor Echeverria.  “It is difficult to know,” he 
says, “whether Justice Scalia’s theory of judicial takings is intended to fit into, or 
instead subvert, established takings doctrine,”21 but he worries that subversion is 
the aim. His interpretation – just as reasonable as Somin’s – suggests that Justice 
Scalia means to establish a per se rule that “every change in established law is a 
taking,”22 and to apply the rule not just to the courts but “to all the branches” of 
the government.23 “In any event, the scope of the proposed new judicial takings 
claim is breathtaking.”24  
 So we have two academic experts on takings fairly interpreting the same 
opinion and reaching dramatically different conclusions about what it promises, 
or threatens, to stand for.  Both interpreters invoke Penn Central.  Somin, as we 
saw, figures the case would play the same role in judicial takings doctrine that it 
does in takings by the other branches.  Echeverria worries that the opposite could 
                                                            
20 Somin, supra note 19, at 104. 
21 John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary is Different, 35 
VERMONT L. REV. 475, 479 (2010). 
22 Id. at  477.  
23 Id. at 481.  Professor Echeverria has told me in a recent conversation that he considers 
his interpretation in this respect supported by the Court’s subsequent opinion in Arkansas 
Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 511 (2012).  He reads the case to say 
that whereas only permanent physical invasions or occupations are per se takings, direct 
government seizures or forced transfers of ownership are always takings, regardless of 
the temporal duration of the seizure or transfer.   
24 Echeverria, supra note 21, at 479. 
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happen, noting that the plurality opinion mentions Penn Central nowhere but in a 
footnote25 – a slight “consistent with Justice Scalia’s abhorrence for the kind the 
kind of ad hoc balancing that Penn Central exemplifies.”26   
 Who has the better of this particular debate I cannot say.  Divining the 
meaning of the plurality opinion is pure guesswork, and I know nothing of Somin 
and Echeverria’s records in that regard.  I have to suppose that their contrasting 
interpretations might be influenced (and appropriately so) by their views about the 
law of takings generally.  Professor Somin is an advocate of “stronger rules for 
regulatory takings rules,” with “stronger rules” meaning rules that protect 
property owners, and constrain the government, more than do the present ones.  
Professor Echeverria probably doesn’t share that sentiment; his professional 
career, teaching, and research interests reflect an ongoing commitment to resource 
conservation and environmental quality. I find it interesting, though, that someone 
like Somin, who wants the plurality opinion to portend much, argues that it 
portends little, whereas someone like Echeverria, who wants it to portend little, 
argues that it portends much.  Or maybe this is exactly as one would expect.   
V 
 It should be apparent by now that even very careful readings of Stop the 
Beach provide little basis for guessing about the likely impact of the plurality 
opinion, were it to become the law. So much depends on what the plurality has in 
                                                            
25 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 716 n.6.  
26 Echeverria, supra note 21, at 481.  Nor does the plurality opinion make any mention of 
conceptual severance (on which see supra note 17), perhaps another indication that 
Justice Scalia and company would just as soon dispense with much of conventional 
implicit takings doctrine.  Cf. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1374-75 (2nd ed. 2010).  
13
Krier:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2014
14 
 
mind, and on what (if anything) it would have to surrender to garner a fifth vote.  
The law could end up being something like what Somin foresees, or what 
Echeverria foresees, or somewhere in between, and in any event could be 
expected to morph over time.   
 If Somin’s interpretation of Stop the Beach proves to be on the money, 
there would be little occasion for drama. We would have a unified and familiar 
doctrine of implicit takings law, equally applicable to all branches of the 
government, the judiciary included.  To be sure, that doctrine makes it very 
difficult to avoid takings liability when the consequences of government actions 
are permanent physical occupations or permanent wipeouts of the value of entire 
parcels that can’t be justified on nuisance control grounds.  Note, however, that it 
is easy to avoid the circumstances that would give rise to those consequences.  
The instances triggering the Court’s per se takings rules arise mostly from 
accidents or stupidity.  Hence most takings cases would continue to be reviewed, 
just as most cases are now, under the Penn Central multi-factor test, which cuts 
the government a lot of slack.   
 Suppose, on the other hand, that Echeverria’s worst-case reading holds.  
There would be a per se rule applicable to all governmental branches, across the 
board: There is a taking when any government action alters the status quote such 
“that what was once an established right of property no longer exists,” period.27 
                                                            
27 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 715.  Of course, there could be a per se rule limited just to 
the courts; that approach would fall on the spectrum somewhere between the extremes 
represented by views like Somin’s and views like Echeverria’s.  No doubt there are other 
variations that might occupy the middle ground, but I want to consider only the one that 
would confine the per se rule to the courts.  It is an especially interesting variation, and 
my thinking about it has been provoked by conversations with Tom Merrill about a 
14
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The problem, though, is that such a rule might well mean less than all it could.  
There are all sorts of ways the rule could be narrowed but still stand; and there are 
ways to limit the rule’s consequences in any event, even if it stands in full.  What 
follows are some illustrations of each observation.  Many of them have already 
been discussed at considerable length elsewhere, so at times I settle for brief 
mention accompanied by references that provide an abbreviated guide to some of 
the relevant literature.  
A 
 As to narrowing the rule, consider what it might mean to speak of a “right 
of property” and what it might mean to say that the right “no longer exists.”  
Lawyers, for better or worse, commonly speak of property as “a bundle of rights” 
– conventionally the right to exclude, the right to use, and the right to transfer.  
The question for present purposes is whether the “right of property” is to be taken 
as referring to any twig within any one of these rights, or to the entirety of any 
one of these rights, or to the whole bundle of rights and their twigs.  From the 
latter rendition – call it “conceptual integration” – it could follow that government 
action destroying only one or several of the twigs or even the rights would not 
necessarily be a taking under the per se rule because the bundle itself has not been 
                                                                                                                                                                  
thought experiment in his property book, MERRILL & Smith, supra note 26, at 1373.  This 
is my riff on the experiment, with apologies to Tom if I have missed the point or 
otherwise mucked things up:  Suppose a state statute would pass muster under the 
conventional implicit takings rules regarding physical invasions, wipeouts, and the Penn 
Central multi-factor test.  The statute is challenged as a taking in state court, which 
upholds it on the ground that the rights alleged to have been taken do not exist under state 
law, whereas actually they do.  Would this amount to a judicial taking, even though the 
court’s misinterpretation of state law didn’t matter to the correct result?  Might the state 
court decision simply be ignored, on grounds of harmless error?  Cf. Frederic Bloom & 
Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 619 (2012). 
15
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destroyed but only depleted; it still exists.  My own view, with which there might 
be wild disagreement, is that the Court has been ambivalent regarding the relevant 
“property right,” sometimes tolerating the destruction of one particular twig or 
right (not the whole bundle) and other times not, especially if the particular right 
is the right to exclude.   
 An obvious narrowing technique – one already mentioned in section III – 
is for a court to make any changes in existing law prospective. As we have seen, 
there is no entitlement to particular rules of property, and this suggests that 
prospective changes in the rules would not work takings.  But a closer look at the 
matter leads me to conclude that this technique might not always work.  After all,  
prospective changes in property rules can constrain and reduce the value of 
existing property rights. The advent of zoning illustrates the point. 
Nonconforming uses were allowed to continue (subject to various limitations), on 
the thought that retroactive application of the new zoning rules to existing uses 
would result in government liability for takings.  Application of the zoning rules 
to undeveloped land, on the other hand, was regarded as purely prospective in its 
effects.  This is obviously incorrect.  Before zoning, owners of undeveloped land 
had existing property rights (the right to develop, constrained only by nuisance 
law) the value of which was adversely affected by the new zoning rules, and 
sometimes very substantially.  In Euclid,28 the Court avoided the difficulty by 
reasoning that the zoning rules were essentially regulating nuisances, but that was 
bogus then and would certainly be considered bogus now, after Lucas and its 
                                                            
28 Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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stress on common law nuisances.29  In short, prospective zoning was actually 
retroactive (the same problem arises today in the context of zoning amendments), 
and the same is true of much prospective lawmaking.  To figure out whether and 
how this point matters turns on the property rights issues discussed at the 
beginning of this section, and it is impossible to say how the Court would resolve 
those issues.  
 Another narrowing technique is suggested by Professor Barros.30 He 
argues that any law of judicial takings (actually, the law of implicit takings 
generally) should apply only to private-public transfers, and not to private-private 
transfers.31  After all, the latter do not destroy private property rights but merely 
transfer them, whereas the consequence of public-private transfers is that private 
property rights no longer exist, because they have been rendered public property 
rights.  
 The literature mentions several other related methods by which to narrow 
the per se rule.  Consider Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Lucas, in 
particular his reference to “background principles of the State’s law of property” 
that limit the nature of any property owner’s title from the outset.32  The question 
in Lucas was whether development activity subject to a regulation enacted by 
South Carolina could be viewed as a common law nuisance under state law; if it 
could, there would be no liability for a taking.  The Court referred the question to 
                                                            
29 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).  
30 Barros, supra note 14, at 919-32. 
31 He notes that his idea “bears a resemblance to Joseph Sax’s distinction between 
government acting as enterpriser and government acting as mediator between conflicting 
private claims.”  Id. at 919 n. 48, citing Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 
YALE L.J. 36, 62 (1964). 
32 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
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the South Carolina Supreme Court, which held that the activity in question was 
not a nuisance under state common law, and so there was a taking.  Suppose it had 
held otherwise, not because there was a precedent holding that the activity in 
question was a nuisance, but because there were precedents from which it could 
fairly be gathered that the activity was covered by the state’s principles regarding 
nuisance law. Would that be a “change” in doctrine triggering a judicial taking?33 
 Nobody knows, but the answer might turn on how deferentially federal 
courts would review state court interpretations of state law.  Justice Scalia 
addresses the matter in a footnote, explaining that the plurality’s vision of judicial 
takings “contains within itself a considerable degree of deference to state courts.  
A property right is not established if there is doubt about its existence; and when 
there is doubt we do not make our own assessment but accept the determination of 
the state court.”34  Professor Fennell notes that a deferential posture would be 
particularly appropriate given the Court’s practice of pronounced deference to 
state governments on the question of what sorts of projects meet the public use 
requirement of the Takings Clause.35   
                                                            
33 As Professor Fennell puts the matter, “When we assess whether property law has 
‘changed,’ we must make some assumption about whether property law is made up of 
narrow doctrinal rules, broad overarching principles, or something in between.”  Lee 
Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 101 n.141 (2012). 
34 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 726 n.9.   
35 Fennell, supra note 33, at 100.  Regarding deference, see also Barros, supra note 14, at 
932-36, noting among other things that the holding in Stop the Beach reflected 
considerable deference to the state supreme court’s reading of the law. And indeed it did.  
The Court relied on a state supreme court precedent that the state court’s opinion did not 
itself so much as mention, which precedent seemed to lead to “counter-intuitive” and 
“arguably odd” results.  Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 732.  In the Court’s view, the 
question is what the state law is, not whether the state law is dumb.  See generally 
Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between the 
IUS Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. &  PUB. POL’Y 37 
(2011).  
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B 
  The discussion above concerns matters determining the event of a judicial 
taking.  Even given the event, its consequences, financial consequences in 
particular, could perhaps be mitigated in several ways.  Recall that critics of 
judicial takings object that they would give rise to financial obligations payable 
from public funds.  This is thought to be inappropriate because it interferes with 
the exclusive prerogative of the political branches, the executive and the 
legislative, to manage the state fisc. I don’t see this argument as a weighty one, 
mainly because state courts make all sorts of decisions that call for public 
expenditures.36 The plurality opinion dismisses the argument on the ground that 
the default remedy for takings would be to reverse an offending judicial decision, 
not to order that compensation be paid.37  The difficulty here is that a taking 
might have occurred in the meanwhile, prior to reversal, and under the Court’s 
decision in First English38 compensation would be due for that meanwhile period.  
But the plurality opinion makes no mention of First English. 
 Tom Merrill has suggested to me a related point, the essence of which is 
that suits for declaratory judgment could be used to determine whether some 
challenged government action would work a compensable taking.  A judgment in 
the affirmative would simply give the government an option to alter or abandon 
the action in question, or instead go forward and be liable for compensation.  It 
                                                            
36 A similar sentiment is expressed in Bloom & Serkin, supra note 27, at 589 (2012). 
37 Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 723. 
38 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 
U.S. 304 (1987).  For discussion of whether First English should apply to judicial 
takings, see Fennell, supra note 33, at 111-12.  Professor Fennell also discusses instances 
in which courts could find funds for takings by, in essence, requiring parties in disputes 
to pay each other.  Id. at 99, 104, 111-14.   
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bears mention that First English could still come into play, but even then the 
approach would limit the financial burdens of judicial takings.    
 A final limiting device mentioned in the literature is statutes of limitations.  
Professor Barros argues that the limitations period for bringing a federal court 
judicial takings claim “should run from the time that the state supreme court 
reaches a binding decision on the disputed property issue,”39 and that the 
limitations period should be the same for property owners who were, and those 
who were not, parties to the state court litigation.  He notes, however, that the 
plurality opinion has language suggesting that suits by owners not parties to state 
litigation would be permitted decades after a state court decision changing the 
law.40  This is another instance of the ambiguity that runs through Stop the Beach. 
VI 
 As we have seen, nothing in Stop the Beach tells us what the future holds, 
even if judicial takings become the law of the land.  The consequences could be 
moderate or extreme or somewhere in the middle, but the ambiguities in the 
plurality opinion itself provide no basis for divining which.  Looking elsewhere, 
however, may provide at least a clue.   
   The law of implicit takings developed by the Supreme Court, in my view, 
is usefully considered as if it were designed to maintain and reinforce two 
important but often conflicting ideological and political commitments rooted in 
the Nation’s traditions – one to strong rights of property, the other to the 
imperatives of an active and effective state.  The Court honors the first 
                                                            
39 Barros, supra note 14, at 951. 
40 Id. at 952-53. 
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commitment with its per se rules, which are narrow in their application but 
nevertheless important for their rhetoric.  For the sake of property rights, the right 
to exclude is protected against even the most trivial permanent encroachments.  
The Court honors the second commitment with exceptions and ad hoc rules that 
weaken the per se rules and provide the government with enormous leeway to act 
free of any obligation to pay compensation.  For the sake of the state, it tolerates 
extraordinary impositions on property values.   
 To paraphrase Justice Holmes, government could hardly go on if it had to 
pay for every change in the law, but, he added, there have to be limits to that 
proposition.41  What limits we have at present are those observed in the Court’s 
rules on implicit takings.  The pattern we see has been pretty stable for a long 
time; if it holds, then we can expect any law of judicial takings that develops to be 
relatively inconsequential.  But that’s a big “if.”     
 
                                                            
41 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
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